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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and identify key problems in Developmental
Testing and Evaluation (DT&E) in the United States Army. A comparative analysis of
several programs is conducted to determine common developmental testing problems.
These problems are analyzed and a set of conclusions and recommendations for future
testing is developed. The thesis provides the reader with a current understanding of the
Department of Defense (DOD) test structure, its relationship to the acquisition process, and
the Department of the Army test agencies involved in Developmental Test and Evaluation.
The agencies identified five common categories of problems across seven systems. These
systems included: the Abrams Main Battle Tank Block II upgrade (M1A2); the Javelin, a
man portable antitank weapon, (AAWS-M); Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
(EPLRS); the Avenger, a mounted Air Defense system, the Kiowa Warrior, an armed scout
helicopter; the Maneuver Control System (MCS), a command and control system; and the
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV). The thesis concludes by providing
recommendations to help future testers, evaluators and program managers to better prepare
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The purpose of this thesis is to explore and identify key problems in Developmental
Testing and Evaluation (DT&E) in the United States Army. A comparative analysis of
several programs is conducted to determine common developmental testing problems.
These problems are analyzed and a set of conclusions and recommendations for future
testing is developed. The thesis provides the reader with a current understanding of the
Department of Defense (DOD) test structure, its relationship to the acquisition process, and
the Department of the Army test agencies involved in Developmental Test and Evaluation.
The thesis concludes by providing recommendations to help future testers, evaluators and
program managers to better prepare for DT&E in the acquisition life cycle.
B. BACKGROUND
Test and Evaluation (T&E) is required in the acquisition life of any Department of
Defense system. Developmental testing is critical to a program moving on in the
acquisition process. Developmental testing, like the entire acquisition process is subject to
budget cycles, agency conflicts, turf battles, congressional influence and other political
factors all of which can cause problems. Problems in developmental testing have caused
schedule delays, inadequate or useless data and unplanned expenditures of large amounts
of money and other resources to resolve the situations. In the current environment of
declining budgets, such problems can result in program slowdown or even cancellation.
There are two major categories of test and evaluation: (1) Developmental Test and
Evaluation (DT&E) and (2) Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). Operational Testing
as well as other types of testing are described, but the focus of this thesis is DT&E.
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) is conducted throughout the acquisition
process to ensure the acquisition and fielding of an effective and supportable system. Early
DT&E is normally conducted by the sub-contractors and the prime contractor. The sub-
contractors test the components as they are developed and the prime is interested in testing
the total system as the components are integrated. The Government test agencies are more
involved during the later acquisition phases to demonstrate how well the weapon system
meets its technical requirements.
There are several key players involved in DT&E in the U. S. Army. DT&E is
normally planned, coordinated, conducted and monitored by the United States Army Test
and Evaluation Command (TECOM), a sub command of the Army Materiel Command
(AMC). The test design, evaluation and analysis role of DT&E is conducted by the United
States Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA). Other critical players include
the future users or Combat Developers from the United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command, (TRADOC), and the Program Management Office (PMO) charged with the
overall acquisition of the system including testing.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
The objective of the thesis is to explore and identify common problems of
developmental testing in the United States Army from the perspective of the different
agencies involved. The agencies or groups focused on were: the Program Management
Office (PMO), the testers and their facilities, the analysts/evaluators, the contractors, and
the users.
The Program Management Office (PMO) is ultimately responsible for all aspects of
any program including testing. The PMO normally maintains a section whose functions
include test coordination. The Army's Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) provides
most of the resources - testers and facilities — for DT&E in the Army today. Analysis and
evaluation for Army DT&E is normally conducted by the Army Materiel Systems Analysis
Agency (AMSAA). This agency impacts the analytical and statistical side of the DT&E.
The contractor or builder plays a significant role in the test, fix, retest scenario of the early
stages of a weapon system development. Finally, the users provide the need and request
the capabilities that the system under test will hopefully provide. The user or Combat
Developer is usually represented by a TRADOC Systems Manager (TSM) or by a
combined TRADOC organization such as the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
The organization and basic DOD test process is described followed by the Army test
structure down to the agencies and offices that are the focus of the data collection. Data are
presented and once the developmental test problems are identified, they are analyzed and a
set of recommendations is developed from this information. The recommendations can
then be used by program managers, testers and evaluators to help them assess and prepare
their system for developmental testing.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question for this thesis is:
What is the most significant problem in conducting developmental testing?




What are the common developmental test problem areas across agencies?
2 What are the common developmental test problem areas across types of systems or
acquisition strategies?
3 To what extent do these problems endanger program success?
4 . To what extent do these problems impact cost and schedule?
5 What can be done by program managers, testers and evaluators or others to
improve the preparation and conduct of developmental testing?
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of the research is limited to Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II systems
tested at United States Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) facilities within the
United States. Seven programs under test or tested in the past 10 years are researched and
analyzed. The systems include the Abrams Main Battle Tank Block II upgrade (Ml A2); the
Javelin, a man portable antitank weapon, (AAWS-M); Enhanced Position Location
Reporting System (EPLRS); the Avenger, a mounted Air Defense system, the Kiowa
Warrior, an armed scout helicopter; the Maneuver Control System (MCS), a command and
control system; and the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV). These programs
represent different types of systems from electronic communications and software to major
weapon systems and represent different types of acquisitions from system upgrades and
Non-Developmental Items (NDI) to full scale development. Other information will come
from literature searches and interviews as indicated below.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research investigation included a literature search of After Action Reports from Test
and Evaluation Command (TECOM), lessons learned reports of major systems, General
Accounting Office Reports, Congressional Subcommittee Reports, Developmental Test and
Evaluation Reports and technical and professional journals. Developmental testing does
not normally receive the public scrutiny of operational testing and therefore much of the
information was gathered through the interview process. Interviews were conducted with
program office personnel, program test officers, analysis personnel, Combat Developers
and contractors who participated in developmental testing of the major programs already
mentioned. Supervisors from AMSAA and TECOM with years of DT&E experience in the
Army were also interviewed. Interviews were conducted in person, over the phone and
through the use of video teleconferencing.
G . ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The thesis is organized into the following chapters.
Chapter U: Background -- This chapter contains historical information on DOD testing
and describes the current DOD test structure within the acquisition process. The chapter
then describes the test structure in the U. S. Army focusing on DT&E and the key players
in Army DT&E.
Chapter III: Methodology and Data Summary -- This chapter explains the methods
used for executing the research design and structure of the analysis. The chapter then
presents the data that were used for the analysis. Most of the data are in the form of
interviews.
Chapter IV: Results and Analysis -- This chapter analyzes the data and indicates their
implications.
Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations -- This chapter contains a summary of
the principal findings of the thesis and offers recommendations for future use.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a basic history of testing in the Department of Defense (DOD)
with emphasis on the last twenty years. The chapter describes the four major categories of
testing namely Development Testing, Operational Testing, Joint Testing and Multi-Service
Testing. The chapter then describes testing within the acquisition process and concludes
with the description of the Developmental Testing function within the United States Army.
Test and Evaluation (T&E) is a critical part of the acquisition process. "Test" denotes
the actual testing of hardware or software to obtain data. These data are valuable in
developing new capabilities, managing the process, or making decisions on the allocation
of resources. "Evaluation" denotes the process whereby data are logically assembled and
analyzed to aid in making systematic decisions. "Test and Evaluation is the process by
which a system or components are compared against requirements and specifications
through testing." [Ref. 1]
The planning and conducting of T&E exists throughout the acquisition cycle. There is
the need for thorough, logical, systematic, and early test planning and the feedback of well
documented, unbiased test and evaluation results to system developers, users, and decision
makers. The purpose of Test and Evaluation in a defense system's development and
acquisition program is to identify the areas of risk to be reduced or eliminated. During the
early phases of development, T&E is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of conceptual
approaches, to minimize design risk, to identify design alternatives, to compare and analyze
tradeoffs, and to estimate operational effectiveness and suitability. [Ref. 2]
B. HISTORY
1 . World War II to 1960's
Equipment testing has been a part of the procurement process throughout the
nation's history. For decades testing remained informal, generally "ad hoc" and evolved
along with the procurement process. During World War II the procurement process began
to take on a more formalized management approach. As the procurement process evolved
so did testing. Testing was conducted throughout World War II. There were engineering
tests to test engineering and scientific characteristics and Service tests conducted by the
various branches to determine if the equipment was sufficient for field use. Testing was
basically sequential, lengthy and dependent on the need of the equipment.
The war ended with much equipment still in testing and a recognition that
research, development and evaluation must continue to be a peacetime effort. Those
involved in testing during the war determined that testing could be greatly simplified under
more completely integrated development agencies. The development and continued testing
of the atomic bomb offered a ready example of such an integrated and expedited effort. An
R&D Division was developed in the Army General Staff in 1946, however it soon fell
victim to demobilization and by 1948 the functions of the R&D division were assigned to a
subgroup in the Logistics Division. [Ref. 3]
Following the war most of the research, development and testing conducted in
DOD dealt with rockets and missiles. During this time the procurement process was
evolving and terminology like systems engineering, operations research, project offices and
contracted engineering support started to come into play.
2. 1960's and 70's
The 1960's saw the formalization of the acquisition process and subsequently the
formalization of the testing process. Initially Secretary of Defense McNamara took a
business approach to the acquisition process fostering total package procurement, strong
centralized civilian control and concurrency. In the early 1970's, Secretary of Defense
Laird and his deputy, David Packard, promoted decentralization and a "fly before buy"
mentality. The Department of Defense (DOD) test policy within the acquisition system
became more formalized and placed greater emphasis on Test and Evaluation (T&E) as a
continuing function throughout the acquisition cycle. The policies stressed the use of T&E
to reduce risk and provide a continuous estimate on the system's effectiveness and
suitability. To meet these objectives it was important that appropriate test activities be fully
integrated into the overall development process. [Ref. 4] It was also during this time that
both the Army and the Air Force were given a congressional directive to establish
independent operational test agencies.
3. 1980s
Early in the 1980's the acquisition system was again reviewed and revised. Test
and Evaluation was further refined in DOD Directives and Military Standards documents
and was becoming a major concern of the Pentagon and The Congress. In 1983 Congress
directed the establishment of the Director Of Operational Test And Evaluation (DOT&E).
In 1983 the Assistant Secretary Of Defense made the following statement:
... the criterion should not be how quickly we can field any new weapon, but
rather how quickly we can field a new weapon that works. The only weapons that
would be significantly delayed would be the ones that operational testing shows to be
unsuitable for combat, and I cannot believe that any of us would advocate saddling
our fighting forces with any of those. In fact, the most likely effect of operational
testing is not to delay, but to accelerate the development process. Trying to fix a
faulty weapon after it's in the field — if it can still be fixed — is a far slower process
than fixing the design before it goes into production. [Ref. 5]
Testing continued to be a target of discussion and reform from outside as well as
inside the Pentagon throughout the 1980's along with the acquisition process.
4 . DOD Acquisition Revision
Defense Management was again looked at in 1985 by a Presidential Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management and there were still other revisions of the acquisition
process in 1987 and in 1991. The focus of each of these revisions was an attempt to make
the acquisition process less costly, less time consuming, and more responsive to the needs
of the operational community. [Ref. 6] The result of these latest revisions is our current
acquisition system, a system that is again under review. Among the many initiatives of the
latest revisions was the push to consolidate documentation. In the testing arena, DOD
Directive 5000.3 "Test and Evaluation" was canceled along with other 5000 series
Directives and integrated into DOD Directive 5000.2, February 1991, part 8. Other affects
on testing include the requirement of live fire testing of major weapon systems before the
production phase and the inclusion of test information in various reports, the Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) for example. [Ref. 7] The acquisition process is again under
review and almost any revisions to the acquisition process will likely impact on testing.
C. TYPES OFT&E
There are four major types of testing, DT&E (Development), OT&E (Operational),
Multi-Service Test and Evaluation and Joint Test and Evaluation. The types of testing
which fall into the realm of DT&E or at least Director, Test and Evaluation (DTE) oversight
include qualification testing, Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) and Production
Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E). The following sections describe these various
types of testing. [Ref. 8]
1 . Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) is an iterative process of design, build,
test, identify deficiencies, fix, retest, and repeat. DT&E is conducted throughout the
acquisition process to ensure the acquisition and fielding of an effective and supportable
system. It is performed in the factory, laboratory and on the proving ground by contractors
and the Government. DT&E includes test and evaluation of components and subsystems at
all Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) levels, it includes modifications, hardware/software
iterations, related software and qualification testing. Contractor and Government testing
may be combined into one integrated program test and conducted to determine if the
technical development of the acquisition process has been met as well as provide data to the
decision authority. [Ref. 9] DT&E involves the use of simulations, models, breadboards,
brassboards, and test beds, and full scale engineering development models or prototypes of
system components or the system itself. DT&E is conducted throughout the acquisition
process as described in the "Testing and the Acquisition Process" section of this chapter.
a. Qualification Testing
Qualification testing is performed to verify the design and manufacturing
process and provide a baseline for subsequent acceptance tests. These tests include
Production Qualification Tests (PQT), First Article Tests (FAT) and other down line
production qualification tests performed to verify process control. The Production
Qualification Test is conducted at the unit, subsystem (component) and system level on
production items and completed before production decisions. The First Article Tests (FAT)
consist of a series of formal contractual tests conducted to ensure the effectiveness of
process, equipment and procedures. The FAT is conducted on a random sample from the
first production lot. [Ref. 10]
b . Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E)
Live Fire Testing was mandated by Congress in November 1986. The law
stipulates that major acquisition programs may not proceed beyond Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) until realistic survivability (or lethality for some systems) testing has
been completed. This testing requires the Services to Live Fire test their weapon systems
as early as possible before Milestone ID. [Ref. 1 1] LFT&E is its own type of testing and
while it is not truly DT&E, the Congress recognized the importance of keeping the Live
Fire Program coupled closely to the development process and affirmed this by requiring the
Director, Live Fire Testing to report directly to the USDA. [Ref. 12] LFT&E is also
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sometimes associated with OT&E. However, there are significant differences between
LFT&E and OT&E. OT&E is further described in the section "Operational Test and
Evaluation" of this chapter. Figure 1 highlights the main differences between LFT&E and
OT&E.
LIVE FIRE OPERATIONAL
Full-Up Destructive Testing Typically Nondestructive
Instrumented To Gather
Vulnerability /Lethality Data
Instrumented So As Not To
Interfere With Tactical
Realism
Typically One On One Typically Few On Few
Oversight, Director, Live Fire
Testing
Oversight, Director, OT&E
FIGURE 1. Live Fire Testing Versus Operational Testing
c. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
The Production Acceptance Test And Evaluation (PAT&E) is conducted on
production items to demonstrate that those items meet the requirements and specifications
of the procuring contracts so production may continue. PAT&E also ensures that
production line systems demonstrate the same performance characteristics and capabilities
of the preproduction models. Such testing is normally conducted by the Program Office
quality assurance section, often at the contractor's plant and may involve operational users.
[Ref. 13]
2 . Operational Test and Evaluation.
The purpose of Operational Test And Evaluation (OT&E) is to assess operational
effectiveness and suitability at each stage in the acquisition process. Operational
effectiveness is a measure of the contribution of the system to mission accomplishment
under actual conditions of employment. Operational suitability is a measure of the
11
maintainability and reliability of the system, the effort and level of training required to
maintain, support, and operate it, and any unique logistic or training requirements of the
system. OT&E may also provide information on tactics, doctrine, organization and
personnel requirements and may be used to assist in the preparation of operating and
maintenance instructions and other publications. OT&E's most important aspect is that it
provides an independent evaluation of the utility of the system and the feasibility of
employing it. [Ref. 14]
For major systems, OT&E is normally planned and conducted by a major OT&E
field agency located within the DOD component. This Operational Test Agency (OTA)
must be separate and independent from both the developing/procuring agency and the using
agency. The OTA is responsible for managing operational testing, reporting test results
and providing its independent evaluation of the system being tested directly to the Military
Service Chief or Defense Agency Director. [Ref. 15] Like DT&E, OT&E also occurs
throughout the acquisition process. OT&E's role in this process is described in the
"Testing and the Acquisition Process" section of this chapter. Figure 2 highlights the major
differences between DT&E and OT&E. [Ref. 16]
3 . Multi-Service Test and Evaluation
Multi-Service Test and Evaluation is T&E conducted on a system being acquired
for more than one Service. All Services involved participate with one designated as the
lead Service. At the conclusion of Multi-Service T&E, each participating OT&E agency
submits an independent evaluation through its normal channels. The Lead Service then
prepares a single report that reflects the system's operational effectiveness and suitability
for each Service. This report goes forward to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) for







One on One Tests Many on Many Tests
Controlled Environment Tactical Environment with
Operational Scenario
Component/sub-system Complex System
Contractor Involvement No Contractor Involvement.
Test to Specification Test to Requirements
Trained Experienced
Operators
Troops Recently Trained on
Equipment








FIGURE 2. Differences Between DT&E and OT&E
4 . Joint Test and Evaluation
Joint Service Test and Evaluation is a specific program activity sponsored by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). JT&E Programs are not primarily acquisition
oriented. Rather, they are means of examining Joint Service tactics, doctrine and systems'
interoperability. JT&E provides information on system requirements or improvements and
for force structure planning. There are both Joint Development T&E and Joint Operational
T&E. Joint Developmental T&Es focus on obtaining information on system requirements,
performance, reliability and other technical aspects. Joint Operational T&Es are conducted
to obtain data pertinent to operational doctrine, tactics and procedures. [Ref. 1 8]
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D. TESTING AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Testing is critical throughout the life cycle of any system. Both DT&E and OT&E
events occur throughout the acquisition process which consists of the following phases:
• Concept Exploration and Definition - Phase
• Demonstration/Validation - Phase I
• Engineering and Manufacturing Development - Phase II
• Production and Deployment - Phase III
• Operations and Support Phase IV
Figure 3 depicts these phases and illustrates that the phases are separated by kej
decision points or milestones. These decision points occur throughout the program life
when a decision authority reviews a program and authorizes it to advance to the next phase
in the cycle. The following section describes the acquisition process and testing event:
normally occurring during the respective phase.
1 . Concept Exploration and Definition Phase - PHASE
The defense system acquisition process begins with the submission of a Missior
Need Statement (MNS) with the Service's Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The
MNS documents major mission deficiencies (or improvement opportunities) in a Service's
ability to meet its mission requirements. The Concept Exploration and Definition Phase
(C/E) follows the Milestone approval for concept studies. During the (C/E) Phase
alternative approaches for satisfying the requirement(s) are investigated. Concept
Exploration/Definition phase assists in selecting preferred alternative system concepts,
technologies, and designs. Documents for the Milestone I review are the MNS, the
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) which provides the exit criteria, the Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) which delineates the qualitative and quantitative system
parameters and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) which identifies the
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Early in this phase a review of historical tests and existing systems is
,
conducted. Preferred alternative system concepts are selected and a draft Test and
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is started. The TEMP defines test phases, schedules and
resource requirements. Prior to the Milestone I decision, laboratory testing, modeling and
simulations are conducted by the contractor and/or the Government development agency to
demonstrate and assess the capabilities of key subsystems and components. [Ref. 19]
b. OT
The operational test agency (OTA) estimates military utility and assesses
operational impact of candidate technical approaches. The operational test agency also
monitors C/E Test and Evaluation for future test planning. OT&E conducted during this
phase supports developing estimates of the need for the new system, a sound physical
basis for the new system, the system's affordability and the impact of the system on the
force structure. [Ref. 20]
2 . Demonstration/Validation Phase - PHASE I
After the Milestone 1 decision, the program enters the Concept
Demonstration/Validation (DEM/VAL) Phase during which selected concepts, typically
brassboard or early prototype, are refined through study and analysis. [Ref. 21] This
phase ends with the Milestone II decision to either enter into Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD), conduct more research and development and delay the
decision or terminate the program. Documents of particular interest to the T&E manager at
the time of the Milestone II review include the ADM, an updated TEMP, the updated ORD,
the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), which is a cost and operational
analysis of the alternative systems, and the Development Baseline.
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a. DT I
During this phase DT&E is accomplished to ensure that engineering is
reasonably complete, demonstrate technical risk areas have been identified and can be
reduced, identify the best or preferred technical approach and that the concept can meet
operational requirements. DT 1 includes T&E of components, subsystems, and prototype
development models. Testing also includes functional compatibility and interoperabilty
with existing and planned equipment. DT conducted during this phase is most often
conducted at the contractor's facility with Government oversight. [Ref. 22]
b. OT I
In OT I the OT&E agency prepares independent early operational assessments
to identify the best design, indicate the risk level of performance for this phase of
development, and estimate potential operational effectiveness and suitability. The
operational aspects of the technical approaches is examined and information on tactics,
doctrine, organization, personnel requirements and critical issues are identified. The OTA
also identifies needed modifications or other issues that need to be resolved before the next
phase is initiated. Typical operational and support personnel are used to obtain an estimate
of the user's capability to operate the system. The OT&E assessments provide a record of
testing, an audit trail, test data, recommendations and conclusions. Testing normally
includes components, subsystems, brassboard configurations or advanced development
prototypes. [Ref. 23]
3 . Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase - PHASE II
The objective of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase is
to design, fabricate and test a preproduction system that closely approximates the final
product. This phase may include Live Fire Testing if required. The information from the
DT and OT along with other documents such as the Updated TEMP, the Beyond-Low Rate
Initial Production Report (LRIP) and a Live Fire Test Report (The Beyond LRIP Report
17
and Live Fire Test Report are required by law of the Director, Operational T&E) provide
the information to the decision makers for determining whether to enter production or not
and what level of production. [Ref. 24] Data obtained during EMD test and evaluation are
used to assist in evaluating the system's maintenance training requirements and in
evaluating the proposed training program. Test results generated during EMD also support
the user in refining and updating tactics. [Ref. 25]
a. DT II
DT II must demonstrate that engineering is reasonably complete, that all
significant design solutions to problems are in hand, and that the design meets its required
specifications within the range of environmental limits designed for the operational
employment of the system. DT II also must verify "fixes" from DT I and assess the
survivability, vulnerability and logistic supportability of the system. Vulnerability (or
lethality) may require live fire testing.
The final phase of DT D is the TECHEVAL. The TECHEVAL is the formal
demonstration that the design meets specifications and it provides the major source of data
for certification of readiness for the OPEVAL. The TECHEVAL provides information
relative to the technical performance of the system. It is the qualification of components
and an assessment of compatibility, inter-operability, vulnerability, lethality,
transportability, etc. The technical evaluation also determines performance limitations and
safe operating parameters, insures the effectiveness of the manufacturing process and
confirms readiness for operational testing. [Ref. 26] Typical test models for this phase
include pre production prototypes or pilot production models.
b. OT II
OT II is conducted to demonstrate performance of the program objectives. It
estimates operational effectiveness and suitability as well as identifies operational
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deficiencies. OT D is used to determine adequacy of publications and support equipment
and to provide information to refine operations and support (O&S) cost estimates.
The final phase of OT II is the OPEVAL. The Operational Evaluation
(OPEVAL) occurs a minimum of 90 days after the TECHEVAL. It assists the developers
by providing information relative to operational performance, doctrine, tactics, training and
logistical issues. It assists the decision makers on the overall suitability of the system to be
delivered as well as influences either a low rate initial production or a full-rate production.
The OPEVAL also assesses the user's viewpoint on the system's desirability. [Ref. 27]
Typical test models for this phase include preproduction prototypes or pilot production
models.
4. Production & Deployment - PHASE III
The objective of this phase is to produce and field the system. Production
Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E) is conducted on production items to ensure the
effectiveness of the manufacturing process, equipment, and procedures. Follow-on
Operational Testing (FOT&E) may be conducted to verify operational effectiveness and
suitability. [Ref. 28]
a. DT III
After the Milestone III (Production and Deployment) decision, Developmental
Testing remains an integral part of the development, validation, and introduction of system
changes undertaken to improve the system or to reduce life cycle costs. [Ref. 29] DT III
verifies corrections of deficiencies in the TECHEVAL, verifies specification compliance
and completes any testing not completed during EMD. DT III is also used to conduct the
major elements of the PAT&E. The PAT&E ensures that production line systems
demonstrate the same performance characteristics of the preproduction models. PAT&E
will continue throughout the production life cycle of the system Testing conducted in this
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phase is conducted under controlled conditions, provides quantitative and qualitative data
and is normally monitored or conducted by a Government representative. [Ref. 30]
b . OT III
OT HI is used to verify correction of OPEVAL deficiencies and to evaluate
performance not tested during earlier tests. OT III is conducted on the OPEVAL model
with fixes. OT III takes the form of Follow-on Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) and is
conducted with production articles in operational organizations. This testing verifies the
production system, tests operational effectiveness and suitability under realistic operational
conditions and demonstrates reliability and maintainability improvements. [Ref. 31]
5 . Operations and Support - PHASE IV
The function of this phase is to ensure that the fielded system continues to provide
the capabilities required and to identify the actions and resources needed to maintain
operational readiness and support objectives. This phase ends with a Major Modification
Approval to identify the actions and resources needed to achieve and maintain operational
readiness and support objectives. The Major Modification Approval encompasses a review
of a system's operational effectiveness, suitability, and readiness to determine whether
major upgrades are necessary or deficiencies warrant consideration of replacement. In
preparation for this milestone the TEMP, and product baseline are updated to describe
program status, changes and issues. [Ref. 32]
a. DT
Development testing during this phase ensures previous test deficiencies are
corrected. DT evaluates proposed production improvements, Engineering Change
Proposals (ECPs), upgrades and determines if the resources are available to maintain
readiness and support objectives throughout the system's acquisition life cycle. As the
system completes its useful life, DT is used in an engineering aspect to help modify the
system for new threats or with new technology or to help in system disposal.
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b. OT rv
A major function of OT during this phase is to evaluate post production
logistic readiness and support and to validate effectiveness and suitability of modified
systems. Follow-on Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) are used to assess logistics readiness,
sustainability, and the implementation of the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP).
Finally as a system approaches the end of its usefulness, OT monitors the system's current
state of operational effectiveness, suitability and readiness to determine whether major
modifications are necessary or deficiencies warrant consideration of replacement. [Ref. 33]
E. DT&E IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
This section describes the testing structure starting from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) down to the key players involved in Army DT&E.
1 . DOD Test Structure
The organizational structure of the DOD concerning acquisition and testing is
depicted in Figure 4. T&E oversight is performed by two offices: the Director, Test and
Evaluation (DTE) and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). The
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), a position held by the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)), performs the management of acquisition
for the DOD.
The DTE is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the USD (A&T) for T&E
matters. The DTE is responsible for all DT&E. The duties of the DTE include: review
major acquisition program documentation for DT&E implications, provide management and
oversight of the major ranges and test facilities, and develop and implement the Live Fire
Test Program.
The DOT&E reports directly to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and has
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unbiased insight into the operational effectiveness and suitability of new weapon systems.
The duties of the DOT&E include approving test plans on major systems prior to OT&E,
approval of OT&E funding for major systems and providing the SECDEF and the
Congress with the Beyond LRJP report. [Ref. 34]
2. Army T&E Structure
The Army management structure for T&E is illustrated in Figure 5. The Under
Secretary of the Army is the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). The AAE is responsible
for all acquisition T&E (operational and developmental tests) planning, programming,
budgeting, developmental test policy and oversight. The AAE performs these duties with
the assistance of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASA/RDA). The ASA/RDA is organized to provide technical assessments and
program evaluations. He resolves acquisition issues whenever possible and makes
recommendations to the AAE on the acquisition of weapon systems. The Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army for Operations Research (DUSA(OR)) is chartered to supervise all
Army T&E policy and has oversight for all Army T&E. [Ref. 35]
3. Army DT&E
The U. S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) is responsible for the management of
DT&E. Under AMC the Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) has the primary
responsibility for conducting developmental tests for the Army and the Army Materiel
Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA) conducts test analysis and evaluation on major
systems. TECOM may be designated as the evaluator for non major systems. The
Structure of AMC and TECOM is shown in Figure 6.
TECOM is responsible for:
• Planning, executing and reporting the results of technical tests. Technical tests include
Development Tests, Technical Feasibility Tests, Production Qualification Tests, Joint
Tests, and contractor/foreign tests.













































FIGURE 6. AMC and TECOM Structure
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(TECOM responsibilities continued)
• Maintaining the Army's T&E data base.
• Maintaining the Army's Major Range and Test Facility Base.
• Researching, developing, and acquiring instrumentation and developing new and
improved test methodology.
• Providing safety confirmations. [Ref. 36]
F. OTHER DT&E ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ARMY.
The testing process extends throughout the acquisition cycle of any system. Many
agencies play a significant role in the testing process. The Program Management Office
(PMO), the Tester and his facilities, the builder or Contractor, the evaluator, the Army
Materiel Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA) in the Army's case and the user or Combat
Developer all are a part of DT&E. They meet formally through the Test Integration
Working Groups (TrWG) and informally based on other factors such as critical issues or
Program Management style.
1 . Program Management Office (PMO)
The Program Manager (PM) is ultimately responsible for all aspects of the system
development, to include coordinating the total T&E program. The PM normally has a
deputy or assistant whose functions include the overwatch of testing as well as writing or
inputting into various test documents and reports. The PM and his office are responsible
for writing numerous reports and plans such as the Test and Evaluation Master Plan
(TEMP). The input to the TEMP is normally influenced by the Test Integration Working
Group.
a. Test Integration Working Group (TIWG)
The PM charters and uses the Test Integration Working Group (TTWG) to
help coordinate, plan, and discuss the testing and analysis effort. TTWG members include
26
representatives from the development agency, the user, both developmental and operational
T&E agencies, logistics, analysis and training organizations. [Ref. 37]
2. TECOM
The U. S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) is the Army's testing
agency. TECOM as presented in Figure 6 has facilities throughout the U. S. as well as
locations outside of the continental U.S. As sub components of TECOM, these facilities
provide the people, equipment, and other resources to conduct various types of DT.
TECOM through its various facilities is responsible for the planning, executing and
reporting the results of technical tests. Technical tests include Development Tests,
Technical Feasibility Tests, Production Qualification Tests, Joint Tests, and
contractor/foreign tests. TECOM is charged with maintaining the Army's Major Range and
Test Facility Base, maintaining the Army's T&E data base and researching, developing,
and acquiring instrumentation and improved test methodology.
3 . Prime Contractor
The Prime Contractor is the Company who is responsible to provide the
Government with the needed product. The Prime Contractor plays a significant role in
DT&E. The contractor conducts his own testing prior to Government tests and
demonstrates that he is prepared to enter into Government conducted or at least
Government observed testing. The contractor's testing during the initial phases of the
acquisition cycle is likely to impact testing conducted by the Government during the EMD
Phase. The contractor may even conduct some DT, observed by the Government, within
his facility.
4. AMSAA
The Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency is AMC's independent evaluator for
the DT process often referred to as the "honest broker." AMSAA is responsible for the
Independent Evaluation Plan (DEP) as well as advising the tester and the program office on
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analytical issues, testing and test documentation. AMSAA's greatest influence is on the
statistical process controls of the tests such as sample size and confidence levels and test
design. AMSAA conducts the analysis and/or evaluation of the testing and provides
members to the TTWG.
5 . Combat Developer
The Combat Developer is usually the "user" or the organization that represents the
user and identifies the need for the system being developed. In the Army this is usually a
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) basic Army branch such as the Field Artillery
or the Armor School. These agencies develop the doctrine and training for their respective
branches based on overall Army tactics, doctrine and guidance. They also help to
determine the needs of that particular branch presently and into the future. These
organizations provide the Mission Need Statements that may grow into development of a
new system or modification of an old system. In some cases the user may be The
Combined Arms Center (CAC) or The Combined Arms Service Support Center (CASSC).
These agencies integrate the training, doctrine and needs of the various branches they
represent and function as an overall user for a system needed by all the combined branches.
The Combat Development agency is the organization where the acquisition process begins
and where the final product arrives.
G. POTENTIAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
There are potentially many issues or problems that can affect Developmental Testing
and many issues that are affected by DT&E. This chapter provided a basic history of
testing in the Department of Defense, described testing within the acquisition process and
the Developmental Testing function within the United States Army. The structure of the
testing within the DOD and within the Army is effected by legislation, policy, both formal
and informal guidance and a continuous reform effort. The management and conduct of
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DT&E impacts upcoming milestone decisions and may hold the key to a program's success
and continuation or its cancellation. The problems that occur in DT&E impact on cost,
schedule and performance of the system and are very important to both the Government
agencies and the contractors involved. The next chapter identifies those issues that are
considered the most prevalent according to the major players in a number of programs.
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SUMMARY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the methodology used and data gathered to answer the primary
and subsidiary thesis questions. An overview of the systems investigated is presented
along with a summary of those data. Research investigation included a literature search of
After Action Reports from Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), lessons learned
reports of major systems, General Accounting Office Reports, Congressional
Subcommittee Reports, Developmental Test and Evaluation Reports and technical and
professional journals and manuals. Interviews were conducted with program office
personnel, program testers, analysis personnel, user representatives and contractors who
have participated in the developmental testing of the major programs selected. Interviews
were also conducted with personnel who had years of experience in the area of
developmental testing. Interviews were conducted in person and over the phone.
B. METHODOLOGY
The focus of the literature search and the interviews was to address the primary thesis
question. The primary thesis question was:
What is the most significant problem in conducting developmental testing?
1 . Basic Interviews
Interviews were the primary method of addressing the research question. A scope
and limitation for the interviews were developed in order to organize the information.
About a dozen systems were considered, this was reduced to seven. The main
Government agencies dealing with DT&E were interviewed. These interviews included
representatives from the Program Office, the tester, the analyst from AMSAA, a user
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representative or the Combat Developer and the Prime Contractor. A basic set of questions
was developed and reviewed by students and instructors with test and evaluation
backgrounds. The initial format was general for all potential interviewees and looked at
these areas:
• What do you consider the primary problem or issue in Developmental Testing?
• What can your agency or any of the others you work with do about the problem? To
ascertain the "work with" relationship of the various agencies and offices, the
questionnaire also focused on:
• How do you (your office) interface with the other agencies? Is this sufficient?
The questions further evolved into five separate formats, similar overall, but
tailored to the particular agency being addressed. For example a PM office was asked how
a particular problem affected schedule or cost. AMSAA would be asked instead how the
problem affected their analysis or reporting. In most cases the interviewee was given a
draft of the questionnaire or allowed to thoroughly answer all questions before any direct
questioning. A copy of the questionnaire for the Program Management Office is provided
in Appendix A.
2 . Special Interviews
Other interviews were conducted to gain insight from people with background and
experience in DT&E. These people were supervisors, branch and division chiefs at the test
facilities, at AMSAA, at TECOM and within the TRADOC System Management (TSM)
Offices. Using the same questionnaire format and focusing on the primary thesis question
these individuals were also interviewed. Again, they normally had time to prescreen the
questions or responded in writing when time was limited.
C. SYSTEMS RESEARCHED
The systems researched were Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II systems tested at
United States Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) facilities within the United
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States. Seven programs under test or tested in the past 10 years were researched and
analyzed through interviews and reports. The systems include the Abrams Main Battle
Tank Block II upgrade (M1A2); Anti Armor Weapon System Medium (AAWS-M),"the
Javelin;" Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS); the Avenger, a
mounted Air Defense system, the Kiowa Warrior, an armed scout helicopter; the Maneuver
Control System (MCS), a command and control (C2) system; and the Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV). These programs represent different types of systems from
electronic/data communications and software to major weapon systems. They also
represent different types of developments, from system upgrades and Non-Developmental
Items (NDI) to full scale developments.
1 . Abrams Tank Block II Improvement (M1A2)
The M1A2 is the M1A1 (main battle tank) with improvements referred to as the
Block II Improvement Program. The improvements to the main battle tank consist of an
Improved Commander's Weapon Station (ICWS); Commander's Independent Thermal
Viewer (CITV); Position Navigation System (POS/NAV); and the core tank. The core
tank includes the turret, hull, fire control electronic units, a data bus to interconnect the new
mission hardware; dual stabilization of the gunner's primary sight head mirror; the Single
Channel Ground Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS); Inter Vehicular Information
System (IVIS); and onboard built-in test equipment. The M1A2 is designed to provide
Armor and Mechanized units with improved mobility, protection and both internal and
external C3I. [Ref. 38]
2 . Kiowa Warrior (OH-58 D)
The OH-58D is a modernization of the OH-58A airframe. The modernization
included a four blade main rotor system, an advanced cockpit display system and a mast
mounted sight to provide day/night targeting capability. Armament was added to some of
these helicopters for a special mission and eventually resulted in a modification program to
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for all OH-58Ds. The Kiowa Warrior was designed to provide reconnaissance, security
and target acquisition functions. It is used with Divisional aviation, in support of armor
assets as well as against threat armor as part of a "Tank Killer Team" and employed by
special operations units. [Ref. 39]
3. Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
The new Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles is being designed to replace the
Army's aging fleet of Two and a half (2.5) ton and Five (5) ton vehicles. These types of
vehicles are used for tactical mobility, supply and support operations. The vehicles will
include a 2.5 ton cargo model, a 5 ton cargo model and special purpose vehicles such as
tankers, dump trucks and wreckers. Its expected improvement over the current fleet of
vehicles includes greater horsepower and speed, increased towing capability, higher
reliability and a high commonalty of parts among the various versions. [Ref. 40]
4. Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS)
EPLRS provides the Army with data communications and ranging information.
EPLRS reports position location and identification data on ground and airborne units to the
radio station operator in near real time. Its performance advantages include rapid response
times and effective data throughput, Communications Security (COMSEC), resistance to
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), and Electronic Support Measures (ESM), low levels
of mutual interference, transmissions for ranging measurement and freedom from voice
data contention. EPLRS will normally be deployed in the Division and Corps areas and
operated by Army Signal Corps personnel. [Ref. 41]
5 . Anti Armor Weapon System -Medium (AAWS-M),"The Javelin"
The Javelin is a man portable antitank weapon system. It consists of a round, a
Command Launch Unit (CLU), training devices and test equipment. The Javelin has the
capability to defeat the current and projected armor threat in all battlefield environments to
include electronic and electro optical countermeasures and the electromagnetic
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environments. The system provides the gunner with increased survivability by having a
greater range, a reduced signature and increased lethality. [Ref. 42]
6. Pedestal Mounted Stinger (PMS), "The Avenger"
The Avenger is an Air Defense Weapon that has the requirements of protecting
friendly critical assets and inflicting maximum attrition on threat aircraft. It consists of a
fire control unit module that includes a turret with vehicle mounted launchers and a heavy
machine gun. The system is mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) but can be operated remotely. The Avenger has a Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) sensor, a laser range finder and an onboard computer which provides the gunner
with displays to engage the target, monitor the system, and receive and display command
and control C2I data. The Avenger is designed to protect the rear areas of the Corps, the
Divisions and Regiments. [Ref. 43]
7 . Maneuver Control System (MCS)
MCS is a combination of hardware and software intended to provide commanders
of all maneuver elements (corps through battalion/squadron and selected companies) a
single command and control (C2) system. It is one of five C2 systems that make up the
Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS). It includes a Lightweight
Computer Unit (LCU), Large Scale Printer Plotter (LSPP), Large Screen Display, Tactical
Scanner (TACSCAN) and software. MCS will enhance decision making and
synchronization among maneuver elements and as a part of ATCCS help integrate and
coordinate other battlefield functions such as Artillery, Air Defense and support functions.
[Ref. 44]
8. System Categories
The systems listed above could be broken down by various criteria. To enhance
analysis and address the thesis question they were broken down by type of system, namely
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ground vehicle, aircraft etc. The systems were also broken down by acquisition or
development strategy such as upgrade or NDI.
a. Type of System
The systems above include one rotary wing aircraft, the OH-58D; one man
portable missile system, the Javelin; three ground vehicle systems including a tracked
vehicle, the Ml A2; a small wheeled vehicle with a Air Defense missiles, the Avenger; and
family of wheeled vehicles in different configurations, FMTV. The systems above also
include two communication/data and information systems, MCS and EPLRS.
b . Type of Development
From a development standpoint the Ml A2 Abrams is an upgrade to the Ml Al
tank. The Kiowa Warrior is also an upgrade to the OH-58A scout helicopter. Both the
Avenger and the FMTV are considered Non-Developmental but for slightly different
reasons. The Avenger is using mostly developed technology designed for the military use
while the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles is pushing the use of commercial
components and parts. The Javelin is full scale development weapon system as are the
software and electronic intensive MCS and EPLRS.
D. DATA SUMMARY
The data summary includes information from both interviews and literature searches.
The interview data will be broken down by program and further broken by agency or
office. In order to obtain answers beyond the "party line" some interviews were conducted
under the premise that the interviewee by name would not be associated with a particular
program or agency. Therefore the data are presented by system but will not identify which
system specifically. The person or office making the response about that system will only
be identified as a representative of that agency or office who played a role in the system's
DT&E. While few people actually requested anonymity, a single name or the name of the
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system would easily divulge almost every person's identity to someone who is familiar
with the agency or system described. Each of the following sections will summarize the
respondents' answers to the questionnaire, specifically:
• What do you consider the primary problem or issue in Developmental Testing?
• What can your agency or any of the others you work with do about the problem?
• How do you (your office) interface (work with) with the other agencies?
1 . System t
a. Program Management Office
This program management representative stated that one of the major
problems entering a Developmental Test was meeting the test start milestone with all
compliant system hardware, software and support to conduct the testing. Delays in getting
to the test start point (caused by various factors) cause a test delay and "all delays impact
cost."
The program manager representative determined that to deal with this
problem, the PMO, particularly the PM, require intensive proactive management at all
levels. Issues need to be identified before they happen and alternative plans developed. He
indicated that the tester "...needs to make sure resource requirements are on hand, plus be
in a positive position to adjust to changes." Finally he noted that all the entities involved in
DT&E need to be more proactive and timely with their input into the test planning and
development effort
The program manager representative described the interaction between his
office and the other agencies as adequate and recognized each of the other agencies as
having an important role to play in not only testing but the entire development process.
b . Tester
This tester considered the scheduling of DT&E the primary problem. He
credited PM over optimism and the budget/funding process as the causes. He stated that by
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the time a system is supposed to enter DT&E, events have occurred that have caused the
test window to be reduced and or delayed. Trie tester may often be left to prioritize the
various tests, getting as many in as possible (but not all) before a report is required and
decisions need to be made.
This tester asserted that it was the tester's job to deal with the situation as best
they can. If anything could be done about this it would probably be the PM being a little
more realistic about when DT&E will occur and how long it will take. The tester also
stated that despite this and some other problems " overall, the system works, especially for
full scale development systems." [Ref. 45]
The tester for "system t" believed there was a good relationship among the
agencies and a "fantastic working relationship" between his office and that of the PM. He
attributed the system's overall success to this interface.
c. AMSAA
The analyst saw scheduling as the primary problem with DT&E. Specifically
he noted that on this program as well as others there was usually not enough time to test,
collect data, compile data, analyze data, make preliminary reports and briefings and final
reports and briefings. His analysis team often found itself working with incomplete data
sets from which they were expected to make final reports required by the schedule. His
primary concern was that key decisions were often made prior to completion of final
reports.
To help alleviate this problem he believed that AMSAA should be more
realistic when signing up to a schedule and find ways of reducing their internal processes.
He said that his agency was addressing the problem by working on methods to shorten
their response time. He thought that the best way for the PMO to deal with this issue was
to consider all that is involved in the evaluation portion of Test and Evaluation. He said the
testers do the best they can given the environment in which they must test.
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The lead analyst for "system t" considered the interface between his office, the
tester and PMO as good. There were regular TIWG meetings, monthly reviews, ad hoc
meetings and special working groups. He said there was little interface between his office
and those of user and the contractor but did not see this as an issue.
d . User Representative
The user representative for "system t" indicated that the most significant
problem with DT&E was that the PM pushed the schedule rather than product readiness.
He believed this problem was a result of the funding and budget cycles. The consequences
of this schedule push was an early "bad name" for the system. He said that this system
initially received a bad reputation because it went into a testing functionally unprepared for
the test.
The user representative thought that his office should have been more
involved in the product design. He believed that the contractor and his office needed a
closer and earlier interface. He indicated that the contractor's engineers still do not
understand the "real" operational environment.
The user representative for this program interacts with the other agencies
through action officers and through the PMO. The user representative believed that for this
system the interface along with the TIWG is normally adequate but recommends more
frequent TTWGs and a more definitive TTWG schedule.
e . Contractor
The contractor believed obtaining the necessary resources to conduct a
successful DT&E was the major problem in entering DT&E. Namely, needed activities
were delayed, not accomplished or shortcuts taken. Also, resources such as funding were
tight and schedules were compressed to the point that completing the test by a specific date
became more important than conducting the test according to the test plan. Subsequently
tests became more difficult to conduct and results harder to understand. The contractor
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stated these types of practices early in the program development tended to push problems
into later phases where they were more expensive in terms of both cost and schedule.
The contractor thought that all the agencies involved could help alleviate this
problem. All agencies should provide better estimates of resources in terms of time and
money. The PM should allow for contingencies and not assume perfect and complete
success at every step along the way. The contractor stated that long term stable funding
would be the greatest help in overcoming schedule and resource problems, but that means
legislative action.
The prime contractor for "system t" was very positive about the
contractor/Government PM relationship "for this program." He made the point that his
experience with other programs between his company and the Army were not as
cooperative. His interaction with the other agencies was mostly through the TTWG
process. The contractor thought for this program the working relationships were good and
provided an "easy flow" of information and good cooperation.
2 . System u
a. Program Management Office
The PMO representative said the most significant problem was that technical
tests were conducted before the PMO and the contractor had sufficient time to do their own
"checking out" of the system. This led to surprises during DT&E impacting test schedule
and costs. The PM representative believed this happened because of inflexible budgets,
changing Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) and because the PM was locked
into an inflexible success oriented schedule.
He suggested that the PM, through management, should be able to work these
issues. First, the PMO should get all the players involved early, including testers and
evaluators, and concentrate on making realistic estimates. Then, the PM needs to ensure
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that the ORD remains solid and realistic. He also said that PMs should view the tester as
part of the team and not the "bad news messenger."
The Program Management Office from "system u" was very pleased with the
working relationships that were established within the program. Besides the formal TTWG
interface, the PMO had established other semi-formal groups to address numerous issues
including testing. The PM representative believed these working groups and their efforts
enhanced the TTWG meetings as well as other aspects of the program.
b . Tester
This tester believed that the schedule was a major DT&E problem for this
program. He said early involvement from the tester and the analysts is key to helping
minimize this problem. The tester suggested that the PMO ensure testers and analysts are
involved early on and that they actively scrutinize test and evaluation schedules before they
are finalized. The tester for "system u" was satisfied with the interface and coordination
that occurred for this program.
c. AMSAA
The AMSAA representative for "system u" identified the changing of software
/hardware requirements as the biggest problem or issue in entering Developmental Test.
Requirement changes often occurred after estimates were made and therefore affected the
test plans and analysis. This changing test environment reduced confidence in the tests and
impeded analysis.
The AMSAA representative indicated that his agency can help with this
problem by working with the PMO to help identify problems early in development. He
also stated that AMSAA, the testers and the contractors must do a better job of controlling
test costs.
The analyst for "system u" said the interface between his office and that of the
PM started as adversarial but improved over time. He believed he had a good working
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relationship with the tester and with the contractor. The analyst was not satisfied with the
contact that he had with the user representative and believed that the analysis people should
obtain more feedback from the troops.
d . User Representative
This user representative thought that the major problem in entering a DT&E
was the flow of critical paper work. Namely, he pointed out those documents (TEMP,
Detailed Test Plan) which are needed to make things happen. When these documents are
late, it impacts and often delays the test schedule. The user representative believed for their
part they should concentrate more on the war fighting capabilities and enhancements rather
than technical issues. This may help reduce the paper delays.
The user representative stated that his contact with the various agencies was
frequent and provided for a good flow of information. The only interface that did not have
regular communication was that with AMSAA. There was only minimal contact with
AMSAA and it was usually formal in nature. He thought the TrWGs provided an adequate
single forum to bring the key players together.
e. Contractor
The contractor cited unanticipated problems that delayed test completion
within schedule and increased test costs as the major issues for DT&E. He ascertained that
these occur because proposed estimates for cost and schedule usually assume no technical
difficulties will be encountered. Subsequently overly optimistic estimates become the
standard to meet.
This contractor representative saw ways for his office, the PM and the Tester
to address this issue. One way in which the contractor believed that his company could
help deal with this problem was to use actual schedule information from historical records
to create more accurate future test estimates. He said the tester also needs to track test
program costs and schedule variances and document these historical data so that it can be
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used when estimating future testing. He said the PM should identify potential problems to
be encountered during testing and formulate contingency plans with cost and schedule
impact acknowledged in the original estimates.
The prime contractor for "system u" noted that the contract office and the
Government PMO had a very good working relationship. The interface with other agencies :
like AMSAA and the test facility was more formal, less frequent, but sufficient.
Concerning DT&E, he does not recall involvement with the Combat Developer.
3 . System v
a. Program Management Office
The program representative for "system v," an NDI Program, identified the
primary problem in conducting DT&E as the belief that the PM has plenty of money for
test. He stated that testers and analysts tended to want to test extensively to reduce their
risk and increase their confidence. However, the PM, like all PMs, had a limited budget
and it was for more than testing alone. He attributed the problem to the acquisition process
and the congressional funding system.
Because the PM representative determined the root of the problem to be the
acquisition process, he suggested that the problem was beyond the scope of the agencies
and offices targeted for research. He did suggest that the PM bring in all the key players
early, particularly AMSAA.
The PM representative described his working relationship with the other
agencies as regular and productive. Most of the interface is formal but gets more familiar
and frequent as major tests or milestone reviews approach.
b . Tester
The tester indicated that the primary problem in conducting Developmental
Testing was reactive involvement by the PMO instead of proactive involvement The tester
believed that the PMO and the contractor often saw DT&E as an area to maybe save some
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time or funds. The PM failed to put emphasis on DT&E until after something went wrong
and both cost and schedule were negatively impacted.
The tester believed that the test community as a whole should educate PMs to
the various test capabilities available. AJso, testers should demonstrate that the test facilities
are more flexible than ever in packaging programs for the PM. He stated the main action a
PM can do to avoid such a problem is to get the tester and the analysts involved early. The
analysts for their part need to become flexible in packaging the analysis and evaluation.
The analysts (AMSAA) must also realize that money no longer exists for huge sample sizes
and that other methods are needed to analyze and design tests.
The tester for "system v" believed his interface with the other agencies was
adequate and was particularly good with AMSAA. Face to face coordination is easily
achieved due to the close proximity to most of those agencies. He stated that good
communication between the tester, the PM and AMSAA is important for successful DT&E.
c. AMSAA
The AMSAA representative for "system v" described the primary issue in
DT&E as the Non-Developmental Item (NDI) status of the system. It was assumed for
NDI programs, because they are "non developmental," that testing and analysis would be
faster and easier. However, any type of a problem during DT&E or any other area in such
a program can be costly. Problems in DT&E brought public scrutiny and possibly
jeopardized the entire system development. This system, although NDI, still required
extensive testing and data collection. The task of data reduction, analysis, and report
preparation was reduced to a shorter time frame because of the NDI status.
The analyst suggested some things that could be done by the various players
to mitigate this problem. The AMSAA representative said that AMSAA is using different
methods of analysis and evaluation to try to speed up the evaluation process. These
methods include the physics of failure and the reliability growth model. The physics of
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failure is the method of using more current electronic failure analysis instead of standards
and specifications derived from early electronic hardware. The reliability growth model
tracks the increasing reliability of a system through its development and projects and plans
for levels of reliability at system maturity. The analyst stated that the PM needs to
recognize how non developmental a system truly is and develop realistic schedules. The
PM should also ensure that NDI is not automatically associated with easier testing and
evaluation. Finally, the analyst thought that the NDI test environment requires AMSAA,
the tester, the PM and the contractor to have a "team" approach to the test.
The analyst from AMSAA for "system v" was very pleased with the working
relationships that had been established among the various agencies. The communication
with both the test facility and the PMO was positive and frequent. There was little
interaction with the user representative and the contact with the contractor was limited to
formal forums such as scoring conferences or TIWGs.
d . User Representative
The Combat Developer addressed the changing of program timeline as the
major problem on entering a Development Test. Specifically he referred to the compressing
of the DT&E schedule and an unplanned DT&E and OT&E overlap in order to make up lost
schedule time. For example, the PM and the contractor prepared for OT I, conducted DT I
during the preparation and tried to correct DT I deficiencies before the start of OT I. The
Combat Development Office believed that this problem "was driven by the desire to always
present the program in a positive light (otherwise risk funding cuts)." [Ref. 46]
The user representative office suggested the best way to deal with the issue
internally was to stake out a performance issue such as reliability and stick to it. This gives
the PM at least one solid perspective as to the system's readiness for test. The user
representative also said the PM should realistically assess performance and system
readiness based on the user's requirements and the system's performance, not on "what it
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will take to get to the next hurdle." As for the other agencies and personnel involved, the
user suggested that they need to be prepared to make the tough decisions, e.g. stop and fix
the test process if needed.
The user for "system v" said the interface with the other agencies is generally
adequate but requires more intense coordination. He stated that the various conferences
and working groups both formal and informal normally achieve their intent but often fail to
resolve major conflicts.
e. Contractor
The contractor considered the biggest problem or issue in entering
Development Testing the question of "how well a system made of many commercial parts
will perform under rigorous military testing?" The problem stems from the Government's
desire to have non-developmental systems yet maintain military specifications and
standards. In some cases the commercial parts cannot hold up to the stringent military tests
and standards.
The contractor suggested that everyone, especially the PM should be more
aware of the complexities in buying commercial items for military use. Tradeoffs have to
be made when buying under the commercial use concept (time versus cost versus
performance). He believed contractors should challenge the various military specifications
and ascertain if a lesser performance level would be acceptable. The tester, who has
knowledge and experience should be involved in contract specifications review for (NDI)
contracts. Finally, the contractor recommended that the Combat Developer should help
assess tradeoffs and delete unnecessary requirements.
The Contractor for "system v" described different levels of interaction among
the agencies. There was regular communication between the contractor's program office
and the Government program office. There was also regular interface between the
contractor and both AMSAA and the tester. The contractor had support personnel at two
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test facilities attend meetings and facilitate good communications. The interface with the
Combat Developer was less frequent but increased as the system prepared for another test.
4 . System w
a. Program Management Office
The program representative stated that his major problem in conducting DT&E
was that you test regardless of how ready you are, "...it's a mark on the board you must
meet." The office also said there needs to be more control over the testing. Some tests are
conducted to satisfy an evaluator's need but may add little to the overall analysis of the
system. AMSAA particularly is not required to test prudently. All this non value added
testing just makes completing DT&E within a very optimistic schedule that much harder.
The Program representative suggested some actions for the various offices to
deal with these problems. First, the PM should have everyone involved early -- about the
time of the Statement of Work (SOW). The test and evaluation participants need to reduce
and justify tests, and budgets accordingly. He also stated that test facilities have recently
become aware of this situation and have responded, but the evaluators were not as
responsive. The PMO believed the Combat Developer should play a more definitive role
in testing. A strong combat development office, that knows the system's background and
the doctrine, could help decrease testing that adds no value to the system.
The program office responded that they had a good interface with the other
agencies. They believed the formal interface of the TIWG was good but attributed the
positive working relationship between agencies to the fact that all the agencies were brought
in early.
b . Tester
The tester for "system w" regarded the "lack of concrete requirements" as the
most significant problem in conducting DT&E. This led to difficulties in test planning and
resulted in schedule and cost overruns.
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The tester admitted that his office could do better at coordinating the test effort
with the PM, AMSAA, and the Combat Developer, but that the PM is the one who must
bring these groups into harmony concerning the test requirements. As for the Combat
Developer, the tester said he needed to define the requirements, learn and understand the
system and appreciate the impact that changing requirements have on the test process.
AMSAA should also try to better understand the system under test.
The tester was pleased with the interaction and working relationships with the
other agencies. The one exception he noted was that his interface with the Combat
Developer was limited to the formal meetings such as TIWGs. He said that the working
relationship was good but needed to be more frequent.
c. AMSAA
The analyst from AMSAA indicated that the biggest problem with DT&E was
its uncertainty. That is, did the tester have adequate control to complete all testing on
schedule and within budget? He further explained that some tests were not performed due
to lack of time, funding or both. This creates "data voids" and makes the evaluation more
difficult.
The AMSAA representative believed that all the agencies can help at least
mitigate the problem, but also asserted that it will take legislative action to get testing "event
driven rather than schedule driven." He stated for AMSAA's part, they should prioritize
testing and work closely with both the PM and tester to design tests that fit within the given
schedule and budget. The analyst also suggested that the PM fund the tester "as needed"
rather than by fiscal year. The tester must learn more about the system under test and try to
anticipate potential test control problems. The contractor should work closer with the tester
to integrate the test item and the instrumentation. Finally, the analyst said that the Combat
Developer should provide more explicit guidance on test set up and installation procedures.
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The AMSAA representative concluded that the interface with the other
agencies was normal and in most cases sufficient. The TIWG, the most common forum,
was adequate for keeping the test community abreast of the status and latest developments
in the program, but lacked in solving detailed, lower level issues.
d. Contractor
j
The contractor for "system w" said that the biggest problem in conducting
DT&E was the lack of adequate coordination between the tester and the contractor
especially when integration checkout was needed between the test instrumentation and the
system under test. This can severely impact both schedule and cost if restarts and retests
are needed.
The contractor indicated that he is limited to bringing the issue to the attention
of the PM and explaining its potential effect on the test and test data. He believed closer
coordination with the tester and a better technical understanding by the tester would help
alleviate the problem, but the PM needs to influence such a relationship. He also suggested
that the Combat Developer establish realistic and unchanging requirements that will give the
other agencies a foundation to develop tests and evaluation plans.
The contractor described his interface with the other agencies as regular and
sufficient. Contact with the PM was both formal and informal and contact with AMSAA
and the tester usually in relation to reviews or technical documentation. He said there was
very little contact with the Combat Developer.
5 . System x
a. Program Management Office
The Program Management Office stated that "The major problem entering this
developmental test program was the compressed test schedule." The test schedule was laid
out with no flexibility and testing continued throughout the program. When problems with
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design or other areas were encountered, delays and slips occurred. The slips in turn
delayed and or compressed DT&E as well as affected other areas such as OT&E.
The Program Management Office had recommendations for the various
agencies in addressing this problem. For the Program Management Office itself, the
representative believed the PM must recognize the importance of the test schedule early and
make a concerted effort to hold the line on design reviews, hardware deliveries and costs.
The PM representative saw the tester as being left to complete testing within many
constraints. He suggested that the tester try to be innovative and find ways to expedite
testing. He believed the contractor could help by delivering hardware on time and
committing sufficient resources to support the test. The PM representative suggested
AMSAA should be open minded to problems, potential solutions and be able to make quick
decisions. The Combat Developer also needs to respond to questions and issues in a timely
manner.
The PMO for "system x" characterized the working relationship with the other
agencies as frequent, direct and both formal and informal. The PM representative
considered this interface sufficient.
c. AMSAA
The analyst for "system x" indicated limited sample size as the major problem
in developmental testing and evaluation. A limited sample size causes data analysis to be
more difficult and increases risk. The analyst recognized that smaller sample sizes were
becoming the norm as funding continues to decrease.
He recommended that AMSAA rely more heavily on models and take part in
building reliable models. AMSAA also should consider modeling and simulation in test
design.
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6 . System y
a. Program Management Office
The Program Management Representative for "system y," an NDI program,
stated that people have great expectations of NDI programs and so the testing schedule for
such a program is very intensive. Trying to fit in all the testing that is required becomes
'
difficult and is the primary DT&E issue for this type of program.
The PM representative for this system believed NDI type programs will
continue to be tested in an accelerated fashion and suggested ways that the PM and other
agencies could deal with this issue. He asserted that the PM should hold "conclusive"
TrWGs. That is, "Make the TIWG important and ensure that the other agencies send
representatives that can make decisions and can speak for that office." [Ref. 47] The PM
also should have the tester and analyst on board early. He indicated that the tester should
coordinate the test effort and start as early as possible. The analysts should accept some
risk and the Combat Developer should develop a good set of requirements and then stick to
them. Changing requirements severely impact the already intensive test schedule. The
contractor should dedicate the right people to the test and concentrate on putting them at the
right place during the key test events.
This person indicated that the interface with the other agencies was good, but
that the PM could improve the results through better management of the TIWG process as
previously cited.
b. AMSAA
The analyst considered the use of contractor test plans and test data for
evaluation and analysis as the major issue. Due to shrinking Government resources, the
use of contractor data is becoming more common.
To address this problem the analyst suggested that AMSAA should be more
vigilant in reviewing test information provided by the contractor and the contractor should
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be more receptive to some of the unique oversight required by the Government. The
analyst also stated that the PMO should build safeguards into the TEMP to deal with using
contractor testing and data. Finally the analyst concluded that even if the Government does
not conduct the test in a certain case, the expertise of the tester will still be needed as will
some of the Government test facilities.
The analyst for this system believed that the working relationship between her
office and that of the other agencies was sufficient. The contact between the various
groups was conducted through both formal and informal means and conducted frequently.
The analyst noted that the proximity of AMSAA to TECOM Headquarters was a positive
contributor to the good exchange of information.
c . User Representative
The Combat Developer for this system considered the decreasing funds for
RDT&E as the most significant problem in conducting DT&E as well as other types of
testing. The decreased funding has caused compromised and reduced testing and increased
risk. This reduced T&E and increased risk environment could be acceptable. However,
typically when problems occur with a system, the program suddenly becomes a target for
inquiry, funding reductions or even elimination because "...the Army failed to properly
test." [Ref. 48]
The Combat Developer conceded that decreasing funding is a reality and
believed it will continue for the next few years. The best way that his office can deal with
this problem is to actively participate in the TTWG process and insure the TEMP supports
the ORD and the requirements in the ORD are valid and realistic.
d. Contractor
The contractor for "system y" stated that the major problem in conducting
DT&E was the inconsistency between the ORD and the contract requirements. The
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inconsistencies increased test cost and test time. Schedule was regained but at additional
cost to both the Government and the contractor.
The contractor suggested some actions to be taken if the inconsistency occurs
and also actions to prevent the problem in the first place. First, in order to resolve an
existing problem, the TIWG members did an extensive cross match of the contract, the
ORD and the TEMP. This created an overall, though not complete, consensus among the
TIWG members. Additionally, continuous tracking of the test issues by the PM helped
resolve the problems. To avoid variation between the ORD, the contract, and the TEMP in
the first place the contractor suggested that the PM and the Combat Developer thoroughly
review the contract and verify that it corresponds to the ORD.
The contractor described the relationships between his office and the various
agencies as both formal and informal and as sufficient. He further stated that he did not
believe the program testing would have gone as well if they had strictly relied on the formal
interface of the TTWG alone. The informal working relationships were a key to the overall
test success.
7 . System z
a. Program Management Office
The Program Management Office representative for this program cited the
Government's changing requirements as the biggest problem in conducting a DT&E.
Changing requirements are difficult for any program test, but with software intensive
programs it's "really tough." [Ref. 49] When unplanned and unfounded requirements keep
coming, none of the documentation is solidified. The detailed test plan, the software test
plan, the Independent Evaluation Plan (IEP) and the TEMP are all affected by the changing
requirements as is the test schedule.
The PM representative saw some ways to address this problem. First, he said
that the tester had to be involved early and be kept up to date on system changes that could
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affect the test. Next, the tester should realize the complexities of software testing. Finally,
the various agencies including the contractor need to make a team effort. He thought for
"system z" that AMSAA took on an antagonistic role and that the contractor was not up
front with bad news. A "team member spirit" might have helped avoided these problems.
b. AMSAA
The AMSAA spokesperson for this system believed that the major problem in
conducting DT&E was that DT&E was a target for cutting costs. He suggested that this
occurs because PMs are cost and schedule driven and that by the time DT&E rolls around
many programs have cost and schedule overruns. PMs start looking for ways to save and
they cut out some development type tests. Cutting tests impacts data, data analysis and
creates more risk and development uncertainty.
He recommended that the PM and the contractor should "realize the value of
DT&E." They needed to "accept testing instead of seeing it as a burden." He also said that
the contractor should be up front with potential problems, especially software problems.
He described the interface between his office and the other agencies as
changing. Originally it was formal, mostly TIWGs and teleconferencing, but this has
improved by becoming more frequent and including other forums and less formal working
relationships.
c . User Representative
The user representative for "system z" regarded the lack of regulation and
guidance for software testing to be the primary problem in conducting DT&E. This made
the development and fielding of multiple versions of software extremely difficult.
To resolve this problem the Combat Developer suggested that the PM office
push for quicker fielding decisions, and the testers and analysts lobby for changes to the
regulation and process for testing software.
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The Combat Developer indicated that the interface between his office and the
others was generally sufficient and that the TTWG was an adequate forum which served the
purpose for which it was designed. He noted that the geographical location between the
agencies; particularly between his office and the former contractor made that working
relationship insufficient.
8. Other Interviews
A number of interviews were conducted with people who through their position
and experience provided insight to the thesis questions. These people represented
supervisors, branch and division chiefs at a TECOM test facility, TECOM Headquarters
itself and AMSAA. These interviews focused on the following:
• What do you consider the primary problem or issue in Developmental Testing?
• What can your agency or any of the others you work with do about the problem?
a. TECOM I
This project engineer said that schedule compression was the major problem
in entering or conducting DT&E. He referred to the continuous pressure to conduct
Developmental Testing in considerably less time than originally estimated. He believed that
the funding and budget process drove this compressed schedule and caused major
decisions to be made with only partial data. He also said that the budget process caused the
PM to focus on budget and Initial Operational Capability (IOC), therefore risking system
quality. He suggested the best way to deal with this issue is for the PM to understand early
on what the capabilities are in the test and evaluation community and to work closely with
the tester and analyst.
b . TECOM II
This representative from TECOM thought that "success oriented testing" was
the major problem in entering or conducting DT&E. This unrealistic and optimistic attitude
makes the tester a "bad guy or gal" when a test reveals a problem with the system. It also
54
fails to allow the contractor the time he should have to improve his design. Because
problems are not planned for, it negatively impacts both cost and schedule when they do
occur. PMs, contractors and everyone else should anticipate and identify potential
problems. To alleviate this problem he thought that all the agencies should simply be more
realistic about developing a test schedule.
c. AMSAA I
This senior analyst said the problem in entering developmental test was that in
many cases we launch into testing with hardware or software that in reality is not ready for
test. He believed that PMs do not always receive a realistic test status picture from their
staffs. No one wants to deal with bad news, even potentially bad news. The analyst
suggested that PMs insure that their staff representatives for T&E have some test
experience and coordinate closely with the testers and evaluators.
d. AMSAA II
Another senior analyst from AMSAA considered the schedule driven
environment versus an event driven environment as the primary problem in conducting
developmental testing. From the analysis point of view this causes problems with data
collection, analysis and reporting. He feels this problem is not easily resolved by any
agency or even all the agencies, because program funding is also schedule or calendar
driven and all the participants know that. He suggested that early coordination, team work
and realistic estimates by all the participants could minimize the effects of this problem.
e. AMSAA III
The next analyst said the most significant problem was trying to obtain an
adequate sample size, one large enough to analyze and yet not so large that it is cost
prohibitive. He believed his agency must move to using more simulation and modeling and
validate that information with a small number of actual tests. He also stated that more
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positive incentives for contractors would be valuable. Rewarding the contractor early, for
good designs that pass early basic testing would be an excellent investment
/. Tester I
This tester stated the PM attitude about Developmental Testing was the most
significant problem in entering or conducting DT&E. He said that PMs are more worried
about the cost and schedule of testing than on using it as a tool. PMs often see DT&E as an
area to try to make up cost or schedule overruns. This attitude is created by the process that
emphasizes getting everything right the first time. Testing often surfaces failures or
problems that the PM or contractor had not anticipated. Such failures can drastically impact
a success oriented schedule.
The tester determined that to improve this situation testers should educate PMs
as to their testing capabilities. Also, the decision makers need to be realistic in their
expectations and let the "test, failure, fix, retest" model do its job.
g . Tester II
Another senior tester saw the lack of early tester involvement as a primary
problem in conducting DT&E. He believed even under an unrealistic schedule, the tester,
if involved early and kept informed could bring the test resources needed for the PM's
requirements. Early participation by the tester and the analyst can help the tester customize
the test program to satisfy the various data and analysis requirements as well as reduce
costs. His bottom line was "bring the testers into the program early."
h. Tester III
The next tester thought that the acquisition process itself was the major
problem in conducting DT&E. The acquisition process causes PMs to be proponents of the
system instead of proponents of the user. The emphasis is on program success instead of
user factors. He believed it is the acquisition process that causes the unrealistic schedules,
the adversarial relationships and systems that are fielded needing modes and retrofits almost
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immediately. To fix this problem, the decision makers at very high levels (DA, DOD, the
Congress for example) need to reward PMs that are critical and objective about their
systems instead of fire them. [Ref. 50]
9. Recent Studies and Initiatives
Several recent studies have made recommendations that apply to the problems
identified in this thesis. These recommendations include streamlining the T&E process;
better risk management and increased acceptance of risk at all levels; testing smarter;
acquisition reform; and early user involvement in the test process.
Streamlining T&E or reducing the amount of actual testing and evaluation needed
was a common theme throughout the studies. In the previous era (Cold War), test designs
and test plans called for enough data generation to practically make evaluation a misnomer.
Despite PM resistance to extensive testing, it usually still occurred. In the Post Cold War
environment testers, evaluators and decision makers will no longer have the luxury of an
unlimited amount of test data. [Ref. 51] The recommendations for reducing actual testing
is to use modeling and simulation, integrate OT&E and DT&E where feasible and to
increase decision risk analysis. The increase in risk applies to testers, evaluators as well as
decision makers. Instead of a zero tolerance mode for development testing, a limited
number of test criteria should be selected and an acceptance of test event risks outlined.
[Ref. 52]
Throughout the studies and initiatives, the emphasis was on testing smarter and
cheaper. The testing community in the Army; AMSAA, TECOM, OEC, and TEXCOM
recognized the need for T&E efficiency and reduction and have started to formally meet,
discuss and even implement some of the ideas. One example is the "improvement of
requirements" determination. The emphasis is to develop realistic requirements that meet
the user's needs and can be efficiently tested. The following example illustrates the concept
of improvement of requirements.
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A user had mandated that a system with a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of
80 hours increase to a MTBF of 150 hours at system maturity. After evaluating and
scrutinizing the requirement it was determined that a MTBF of 150 hours made no
significant impact on mission success but increased program risk and would take a lot
of time to test. After a realistic analysis, the MTBF was increased to 1 14 hours at
maturity. This took less test time, reduced program risk and improved the system
within realistic terms. [Ref. 53]
An area mentioned by many respondents in the interviews was testing within the
acquisition process itself. The respondents normally suggested ways to resolve problems
within the system believing the acquisition process too difficult to change. However,
unlike other reform efforts in the recent past, there is anticipation that an opportunity truly
exists to improve the process. The Cold War is over and DOD resources are very limited
and agencies like the GAO argue that this is an ideal time to change the system.
Changes of the type needed will not come easily. They must be directed at the
system of incentives that has become self-sustaining and very difficult to uproot. The
incentives that motivate the participants must be realigned with better program
outcomes. If we expect program sponsors to be forthright about program
alternatives, costs and risks, such candor must be rewarded, and parochialism and
undue optimism penalized. Ultimately, change will occur only through the collective
action of the acquisition participants, particularly within the Department of Defense
and the Congress, for it is their actions that dictate the incentives that drive the
process. [Ref. 54]
Early user involvement is another recommendation cited by the various studies.
The studies state that the users can help the tester and evaluator focus in on those areas that
are critical to mission success and system performance rather than just specifications. Early
user involvement also should make users more familiar with the test environment so that
they can help the tester and other decision makers determine the value and utility of future
technologies. It should also give the user an appreciation for the test process and the
impact of changing requirements.
Today may in fact be the best opportunity the Government has ever had to
improve the overall acquisition process. Such an idea is politically popular and it appears
more agencies than ever are looking into the "how" of changing the process. Any changes
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to the acquisition process will likely affect testing and testing, in fact, continues to be one
of the focus areas of the present reform effort.
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the results and analysis of the data presented in the previous
chapter. The focus for the analysis was on the primary thesis question: "What do you
consider the most significant problem in conducting Developmental Testing?" After
analyzing the agency responses it was determined that five problems areas were commonly
noted across agencies. The responses were then categorized into one of the five common
problem areas. The categories included: (1) Schedule problems, (2) Problems with the
Acquisition Process, (3) Test Culture Problems, (4) Resources Management and (5)
Changes in Requirements. The problems were analyzed by system, by agency as well as
by the type of system and its development strategy. This analysis led to a unique finding in
reference to a system's development strategy and discussed in the "Other Observations"
section of this chapter.. The categories are explained below and Table I presents a
simplified summary of the results.
1 . Schedule
This category describes problems or issues related to test schedule and insufficient
test time. The various respondents described these problems with "schedule crunch or
squeeze," "lack of time for proper testing," or "schedule push."
2 . Acquisition Process
The Acquisition Process category describes the responses that focused on testing
problems that are a consequence of the overall acquisition process. These responses
concentrated on the processes that create problems for DT&E as well as other areas.
Common answers included: "the process creates unrealistic optimism and expectations,"
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"congressional funding does not allow for good long term planning," or "the process
overburdens both the Government and the contractor with bureaucracy."
TABLE I
INTERVIEW RESULTS
PROBLEM Schedule Acquisition Test Resources Change in
AGENCY Process Culture Management Requirements
PMO XX XXX - X X
TESTER xxxx X XXXX - X
AMSAA XXX XX XX XX X
CD* XX XX - X -
Kr** X X X X X
TOTAL 12 9 7 5 4





3 . Test Culture
The next type of problem identified was described as test culture. This category
consists of the responses which indicated that negative attitudes and stereotypes exist
toward testing, testers and analysts. This "culture" is blamed for many of the problems
including the adversarial relationships and inadequate communication and cooperation
between the test community and other agencies. Responses included comments such as
"late tester involvement," "lack of coordination due to adversarial role of the tester,"
"tester/analyst the bad news messenger," "DT - a place to make up lost schedule or dollars"
or "DT as an inconvenience to the program ."
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4. Resources Management
Resource management relates to problems noted by the respondents such as lac
of funds, instrumentation, hardware or software. It also refers to the failure by one or
more agencies to ensure that those same types of resources are at the right place, at the right
time to conduct the proper testing.
5 . Change In Requirements
Change in Requirements is the final problem area in which responses were
categorized. Problems of this nature occur when changes in the requirements in turn
impact the TEMP, test conduct and or the evaluation. This problem was also mentioned by
many of the respondents, but usually as an aside and not as the most significant problem.
B. ANALYSIS
This section summarizes the findings from the responses by category. The categories
are further divided into findings across systems and findings across agencies. Each of
these areas summarizes what the respondents determined as the cause(s) of the problem.
Finally, for each category, recommendations are provided for problem minimization,
avoidance or prevention.
1 . Schedule
a. Findings Across Systems
Schedule was the most frequent problem mentioned in the interviews. Five of
the seven systems represented had at least one respondent describe schedule type problems.
In addition, of those who stated that the acquisition process (next category) was the major
problem, many pointed to the negative impact on schedule caused by the acquisition
process. The process appeared to encourage unrealistic schedule estimates from all
agencies. The respondents generally concluded that extremely optimistic management was
the primary reason for schedule problems. Schedules were developed months, even years
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in advance, always anticipating success along the way, but failing to take into account
historical test information or previous test experience. If the test completion date could not
be adjusted, test reduction and compression resulted in order to meet the schedule.
b. Findings Across Agencies
Across agencies, at least one representative from each agency described
schedule as a significant problem. The testers and AMSAA believed that schedule
problems were a product of unrealistic estimates. Testers and analysts were either not
involved in early estimates or they signed up to an overly aggressive test schedule. The
Combat Developers and PM offices cited over optimism and fear of funding cuts as the
causes for schedule problems. The responding contractor in this category focused on
estimates that assume no technical difficulties as cause of the problem.
c. Recommendations
The following is a summary of respondents' recommendations to minimize or
prevent schedule problems:
• PMs should push for early involvement of all the participants including the testers and
evaluators.
• More realistic estimates should be made by all agencies involved with less optimism
from the PM.
• The PM should make the testers and evaluators part of the team and not the bad news
messengers.
• The Combat Developer should be actively involved in test planning from the
beginning.
• Historical information and data from previous tests should be used to better estimate
future tests costs and schedule.
Schedule was the most common problem mentioned in the interviews. The
respondents generally cited PM optimism and unrealistic estimates as the cause of schedule
problems. Overall early agency involvement and participation and realistic estimates were
recognized as the best methods to prevent or minimize schedule problems.
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2 . Acquisition Process
a. Findings Across Systems
Across systems, six of the seven systems had at least one respondent describe
the acquisition process as the most significant problem. The major causes for this problem
were the funding process and PM over-optimism. The annual control of funds forces PMs
to be optimistic and show positive progress in cost, schedule and performance on a regular
basis. If not, the PM faces possible funding cuts.
PM optimism forces other agencies to plan and schedule based on the PM's
extremely optimistic plans. Thus, testers and analysts sign up to try to meet aggressive
schedules. The respondents concluded that these optimistic plans and schedules were
unrealistic and based on meeting the schedule, not on historical test information or test
experience.
b. Findings Across Agencies
Every agency identified the acquisition process as a problem. The PM
representatives focused on the fear of losing funding and support as the cause of the
problem. One tester indicated the acquisition process was the major problem. He believed
the main cause was the current incentive system that rewarded PMs for being unrealistically
optimistic. Two AMSAA representatives stated that the acquisition process was the major
problem area and pointed to unrealistic early estimates as the cause. Two Combat
Developers also determined the process was the major problem. One believed the cause
was the layers of bureaucracy and paperwork. The other Combat Developer regarded
inconsistencies within the process as the cause. The contractor also determined the
inconsistencies as the cause of problems. For example: the military is told buy "off the
shelf items," but the items must still meet rigid requirements and standards that some
"shetF items cannot possibly meet
64
c. Recommendations
The assumption for most of the respondents was that the acquisition process
wiJ] not or cannot be changed or reformed enough to impact DT&E. The recommendations
to improve acquisition process problems were based on that assumption and include:
• PMs should push for early involvement of all participants including the testers and
evaluators.
• PMs should hold participative and conclusive TIWGs to address test plans and
schedules.
• The Combat Developer should be involved early and play a definitive role.
• The analysts should utilize more efficient methods of evaluation, more modeling and
simulation and accept more risk.
• Senior decision makers should find a way to reward PMs who are critical and
objective.
The acquisition process was considered a major problem in conducting
DT&E. The acquisition process was also cited as the cause of some of the other categories
of problems identified in this thesis. Early and definitive involvement from the tester, the
analyst and the Combat Developer were common recommendations for addressing this
problem.
3 . Test Culture
a. Findings Across Systems
The Test Culture category had the third most responses overall. The
representative causes noted for this problem included 1) the acquisition process itself, 2)
lack of PMO understanding of test and analysis capabilities and constraints, and 3) the
assumed reputation of testers and analysts as wanting to overtest. The respondents
believed the acquisition process drove PMs to focus on cost and schedule and regard
DT&E as an opportunity to make up time and money. Interviewees also indicated that PM
Offices may not realize what the testers and evaluators can or cannot do within the
constraints of the budget and the schedule. Therefore, unless the PMO involves the tester
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and analyst early, PM offices could develop unrealistic test plans. Finally, some testers
and analysts have earned poor reputations among Program Offices by conducting tests or
pursuing additional data that a appeared to add no value to the process. This practice has
caused increased costs and affected the credibility of testers and analysts.
b. Findings Across Agencies
The majority of the responses for this category were represented by test
agencies. Four of the seven respondents in this category were testers; AMSAA and one
contractor were also represented. The PM representatives and the Combat Developers as
agencies did not respond in this category. The testers, three of whom were supervisors
within TECOM, believed that test culture was root of many cost and schedule problems.
They pointed to the acquisition process as the cause of this culture. The process
encourages the PM to move through testing quickly. If problems occur in testing, the
testers and the analysts are usually the presenters of the bad news. Bad test news can mean
rescheduling tests, may bring into question system need and validity from outsiders, and
affect other cost and schedule issues for the PM. Two AMSAA representatives had
responses that fit into this category. Both pointed to lack of funding and the funding cycle
as the cause of the problem. The current funding system does not allow the PM efficient
long term planning and in turn does not allow the testers and analysts to execute long term
planning. One contractor representative believed that the acquisition process was the major
cause of this negative approach to testing experienced in many PM Offices. He said that
the process causes PMs to focus on cost and schedule and regard reducing DT&E reduction
as an opportunity to make up for schedule and cost overruns.
c. Recommendations
The recommendations presented by the respondents for fixing, mitigating or
preventing problems in Test Culture include:
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PMs should push for early involvement of all the participants including the testers and
evaluators.
PMs should ensure that AMSAA, the tester and the contractor closely coordinate the
test effort.
PMs and contractors should realize the value that DT&E provides to development.
Testers should educate PMs on their capabilities and demonstrate more flexibility in
packaging test programs.
Testers should become more familiar with the systems under test.
Combat Developers should develop and stick to solid, realistic requirements.
The PM must make the testers and evaluators part of the team and not the bad news
messengers.
Test Culture problems were generally recognized by testers and analysts. The
causes noted for this problem included the acquisition process itself, lack of PMO
understanding of test and analysis capabilities and constraints, and the assumed reputation
of testers and analysts as wanting to overtest. To prevent or minimize this problem most
respondents determined that PMs should make the test community (testers, analysts) part of
the team and the test community should better educate PMs, contractors and Combat
Developers of their respective DT&E capabilities and limitations.
4 . Resources Management
a. Findings Across Systems
Resource management was mentioned as a problem by three of the seven
systems. Respondents indicated that the causes of this problem included short term
funding and limited resources (hardware and software) for DT&E. A system entering
DT&E awaiting funding may not receive the resources in the lead time needed for proper
test conduct. Lack of funding could delay test setup, delay instrumentation/equipment
checks, cause inconclusive or even useless early test results and reduce needed test support
personnel. Short term funding also causes PMs to desire and plan for perfect success in
the test process. Anything other than perfect success could impact future funds.
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Systems under development are often constrained by limited prototypes, test
models, versions of software, and other components. Other required events of a system's
development could cause these limited resources to be spread across the country and not at
the test facility in time for proper test preparation. The lack of resources at the right place at
the right time could severely affect test schedule, the test conduct or the evaluation and
reporting process.
b . Findings Across Agencies
All agencies were represented in this category except the testers. The PM
representative indicated that resources management was the major problem and believed the
cause was the lack of aggressive management by the PMO. The two analysts from
AMSAA believed that limited funding was the cause for this problem. The prime
contractor pointed to reduced funding and compressed schedule as the cause of resource
management problems. The Combat Developer believed the problem existed because of the
increasing use of software in modern systems. Software testing, like the entire software
management issue, lacks in information, experience and guidance. This is a new
environment and creates many problems for testing as well as other functions.
c. Recommendations
The actions recommended by the respondents to resolve or at least minimize
Resource Management problems include:
• The PM should require intensive, proactive management at all levels.
• PMs should plan for contingencies and not assume perfect success in the test process.
• PMs fund testing to insure test resources are on hand when needed so that testers can
be in a position to adjust to change.
• All those involved in the DT&E process need to be timely with their input into the test
plan.
• Agencies should provide solid, realistic estimates of resources in terms of both time
and dollars.
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• Testers should become more familiar with the systems under test especially software
intensive systems.
Resources Management was another common problem area. The lack of
proper resources at the right place, at the right time could severely affect the test and
evaluation of a system. Short term funding and limited resources for DT&E were noted as
the causes of this problem. The recommendations that addressed this problem included:
fund testing to insure test resources are on hand when needed; tester familiarity with
systems under test, especially, software intensive systems; and incorporating more realistic
estimates of test resources required by all agencies.
5 . Change In Requirements
a. Findings Across Systems
Change in (technical) Requirements is the final problem area in which
responses were categorized. Four of those interviewed described this as the major problem
or issue in conducting DT&E. These four responses represented four different systems.
They indicated that the causes of this problem were the lack of coordination and or
communication between agencies and the lack of understanding of DT&E process among
the Combat Developers. Lack of communication and coordination results in major
documents such as the ORD, the TEMP, and the contract, not matching up with
requirements. It causes difficulties in defining test requirements and makes test plans and
conduct more difficult and expensive than originally estimated. Combat Developers who
may not be familiar with the test process may not realize the impact that a requirement
change could have on the test and evaluation process.
b. Findings Across Agencies
Across agencies there was one response for each of the agencies except from
the combat developers. None of the five Combat Developers or user representatives
determined that change in requirements was the biggest problem in DT&E. This is notable
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since these agencies are most likely to generate changes that impact the PM, the testers and
the evaluators. The PM representative believed the lack of good communication and
cooperation among agencies was the cause of the problem. The tester and the AMSAA
representative believed the lack of coordination and lack of understanding of the T&E
process on the part of the user representative was the cause. The contractor representative
pointed to both coordination and communication as the basis for this problem.
c. Recommendations
The recommendations for reducing requirement changes include:
• The PM should insist that a solid, stable and realistic ORD be maintained.
• PMs should hold participative and conclusive TTWGs.
• The PM should establish a better working relationship among the agencies in defining
test requirements.
• The Combat Developer should appreciate the impact that changing requirements has on
the system and the test process.
• The PM should ensure that the major documents, to include the contract, are closely
coordinated.
Change in Requirements was the fifth category of significant problems. The
respondents cited the lack of coordination and/or communication between agencies and the
lack of understanding of DT&E process among the Combat Developers as the causes of
this problem. Overall, the agencies believed that strong PM management of people,
resources and critical documents was the best way to prevent problems associated with
change in requirements.
C. OTHER OBSERVATIONS
Analysis was also conducted to determine if the type of system or its development
strategy influenced the problems that occurred. This analysis used information gathered
from the seven systems and did not include responses from the interviews conducted with
supervisors at AMSAA and TECOM. Analysis by type of system (one aircraft, three
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ground vehicles, one antitank weapon and two communication/data and information
systems) revealed little relationship between the categories of problems and the type of
system. This could imply that the problem areas identified in this thesis are generally
applicable to Army systems regardless of type of end item. It also indicates that the
recommendations that address these problems may be applicable to various Army systems.
Responses were then analyzed by the development strategy of the systems against the
categories of problems. The development strategies for the systems reviewed were: full
development, major upgrade to an existing system and Non-Developmental Item . The
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X- A single agency whose responses applied to that particular category.
TABLE II appears to indicate that overall, the type of development strategy may have
minimal influence on the DT&E problems experienced by a system. However, there are
two areas where a relationship may exist (shaded): 1) Schedule problems and upgrades in
development and 2) the acquisition process and NDI developments.
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1 . Schedule and Upgrades
Two systems, both representing upgrades in development, had at least three of the
agencies for their respective systems indicated that schedule was the major problem in
conducting DT&E. This indicated that a relationship may exist between schedule type
problems and upgrade type developments. The cause for this relationship may be that
"upgrades" are often seen as simply integrating new components and subsystems. DT&E
schedules are developed to focus on the upgrade. Upgrades however, may be extensive
and incorporate the latest technology and the "simple integration" may prove more difficult
than anticipated. The early test schedule and planning for the upgrade probably does not
anticipate the impact of new technologies and the significance of the integration on the old
system.
2 . Acquisition Process and NDI
Problems with the acquisition process and NDI developments also seem to be
associated. There were two systems in the NDI spectrum of development. Most of the
respondents, including both the PM representatives, for these systems indicated that the
acquisition process was the major problem in conducting DT&E. The likely cause of this
relationship is that NDI developments are often seen by senior leaders and the Congress as
a kind of panacea acquisition model. NDI should be a more expedited process, to include
DT&E. However, the acquisition process, as previously mentioned, already proliferates
over optimism which is accentuated for NDI developments. This creates an environment of
extremely high, unrealistic expectations for NDI developments. When these expectations
are not realized within the original cost and schedule estimates, the system becomes the
target of scrutiny and question.
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3. Recommendations
The recommendations that address these two relationships include:
• PMs, as well as others, should avoid underestimating the DT&E process for ND1 and
system upgrades.
• Historical test and analysis information and data from components and subsystems
should be used to better estimate future tests costs and schedule.
• PMs should hold participative and conclusive TIWGs to address test plans and
schedules.
• More realistic estimates should be made by all agencies involved with less optimism
from the PM.
• PMs should push for early involvement of all the participants including the testers and
evaluators.
Overall, the type of development strategy may have minimal influence on the
DT&E problems experienced by a system. However, there are two areas where a
relationship may exist: 1) Schedule problems and upgrades in development, and 2) the
acquisition process and NDI developments. Both relationships may be the result of the
high expectations of these types of development efforts. Many of the previous
recommendations for schedule problems and acquisition problems hold true for these two
relationships. In addition PMs, as well as others, should avoid underestimating the DT&E
process for NDI and system upgrades simply because they are "supposed to be easier."
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this thesis was to explore and identify recurring problems in
developmental testing in the United States Army, analyze the problems and make
recommendations to prevent and or minimize these problems. As a result of this
comparative analysis, it appears that Developmental Test and Evaluation is subject to many
of the same problems that occur in the acquisition process. This chapter presents the
conclusions and recommendations derived from the analysis of the previous chapter.
B. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This thesis concludes that five significant problem areas exist in conducting
Developmental Test and Evaluation. In order of significance these problems are: 1)
Schedule Problems, 2) Problems with the Acquisition Process, 3) Test Culture Problems,
4) Resources Management Problems and 5) Problems with Changing Requirements. The
thesis also concludes that the type of development strategy may influence which of these
problems is most prevalent. Finally, the thesis concludes that the most recognized method
to alleviate or prevent these problems is for the PM to involve the tester, the analyst and
Combat Developer early in development.
C. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
1 . Schedule
Schedule problems were the most common and the most significant problems in
conducting DT&E. Schedule problems are caused by the acquisition process which
encourages over optimism, unrealistic schedule estimates and emphasizes completing the
test on schedule over conducting the test according to plan. The process may cause the PM
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and his staff to develop early estimates without considering historical test information or the
experience of the tester or analyst.
2 . Acquisition Process
The acquisition process itself presents a significant problem to conducting DT&E
as well as being a cause of other related problems. Nearly every agency addressed the
acquisition process as a major problem. The causes for this problem included the funding
process and PM over optimism. The funding process rewards PMs for being on schedule,
under budget and meeting the criteria of the next milestone, but not for being critical and
objective about their system and not for taking a user perspective. Over optimism by the
PM in his planning and scheduling, forces other agencies in turn to sign up to unrealistic
plans that are based on meeting an aggressive schedule not based on the system's readiness
for testing.
3 . Test Culture
This thesis concluded that a negative test culture exists and this culture was the
basis of many DT&E problems. PMs, their staffs, and sometimes contractors have a
negative attitude toward testing, testers and analysts. The representative causes noted for
this problem included: 1) the acquisition process itself, 2) lack of PMO understanding of
test and analysis capabilities and constraints, and 3) the assumed reputation that testers and
analysts require excessive testing.
The acquisition process drives PMs to focus on cost and schedule and regard
DT&E as an opportunity to make up time and money. PM Offices may not realize what the
testers and evaluators can or cannot do for the PM unless the PMO involves the tester and
the analyst early. Some testers and analysts have earned poor reputations among Program





Resources management of critical test assets was another major problem in
conducting DT&E. The causes of this problem included short term funding and limited
resources (hardware and software). A system entering DT&E without adequate test
funding may not receive the resources in the lead time needed for proper test conduct. Lack
of funding could delay test setup, delay instrumentation/equipment checks, and reduce
needed test support personnel. Short term funding also caused PMs to desire and plan for
perfect success in the test process. Systems under development are often constrained by
limited prototypes, test models, versions of software, and may be spread across the
country. The lack of resources can severely limit effective testing evaluation and reporting.
5 . Change in Requirements
Changes in requirements were a major problem for DT&E. The causes of this
problem were the lack of coordination and/or communication between agencies and the lack
of understanding of DT&E process among the Combat Developers. Lack of
communication and coordination resulted in documents such as the ORD, the TEMP, and
the contract, not matching in terms of requirements. It caused difficulties in defining test
requirements and made test plans and test conduct more difficult and expensive than
originally estimated. Combat Developers, the agency where most changes come from, may
not be familiar with the test process and may not realize the impact that a requirement
change has on the test and evaluation process.
6 . Other Conclusions
a. Developmental Strategy
This thesis also concluded that a system's development strategy may be
related to the type of problems a system encounters. Two particular areas which reveal
strong relationships were 1) Schedule problems and upgrades in development and 2) the
acquisition process and NDI developments. The main cause for both these relationships
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was that these types of developments tend to promote very high expectations among PMs,
senior decision makers and other agencies. It has often been anticipated that there should
be minimal problems in the DT&E of such developments (although the contrary is more
likely). Therefore, when cost and schedule overruns occur prior or during DT&E, the
senior decision makers, other agencies and even the Congress scrutinize and reassess the
system.
b. Early Involvement
Early involvement of the tester, the analyst and the Combat Developer is
critical to minimizing and or preventing DT&E problems. Having the PM bring these
agencies in early to help estimate, plan, and coordinate the test effort was the most common
recommendation made. This recommendation was observed across systems, agencies, and
all categories of problems.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
To improve Developmental Test and Evaluation, Program Managers, testers, analyst,
Combat Developers and contractors should review and address the DT&E problems
identified in this thesis. Specifically they should be prepared to address and account for
problems involving: 1) Schedule, 2) the Acquisition Process, 3) Test Culture 4) Resources
Management and 5) Changing Requirements, in that order.
1 . General Recommendations
The PM should bring in all agencies for early planning, especially the tester, the
analyst, and the Combat Developer. The PM's DT&E effort should concentrate on realistic
estimates of test cost and schedule, make the test community part of the team, aggressively
manage test resources, and foster a working relationship between agencies that emphasizes
cooperation and communication. The following is a list of general recommendations to
prevent or minimize the problems identified in this thesis:
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• PMs should push for early involvement of all the participants including the testers,
analysts and Combat Developers.
• The PM must make the testers and analysts part of the team and not the bad news
messengers.
• Agencies should provide solid, realistic estimates of resources in terms of both time
and dollars.
• Testers should educate PMs on their capabilities and demonstrate more flexibility in
packaging test programs.
• Combat Developers should develop and stick to solid, realistic requirements.
2 . Specific Recommendations
The following recommendations are made to address each of the specific
categories noted in the thesis.
a. Schedule
• Starting with the PM and his staff, more realistic schedule estimates should be made
by all agencies involved
• PMs should hold participative and conclusive TIWGs to address test plans and
schedules.
• Historical information and data from previous tests should be used to better estimate
future test schedules.
b. Acquisition Process
• The analysts should not promote excessive testing and should integrate other and more
efficient methods of evaluation including modeling and simulation.
• Senior decision makers should reward PMs who are realistic and objective about the
development of their system.
c. Test Culture
• PMs should ensure that AMSAA, the tester and the contractor closely coordinate the
test effort
• PMs and contractors should realize the value that DT&E provides to their development
effort.
• Testers should educate PMs on their capabilities and demonstrate more flexibility in
packaging test programs.
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• The PM must make the testers and analysts part of the team and not the bad news
messengers.
• Testers and analysts should become more familiar with the systems under test to better
understand, "What to test?"
d. Resources Management
• The PM should require intensive, proactive management at all levels.
• PMs should plan for contingencies and not assume perfect success in the test process.
• PMs should fund testing to insure test resources are available when needed for proper
test conduct.
• Testers should become more familiar with the systems under test especially software
intensive systems.
e . Change in Requirements
• The PM should insist that a solid, stable and realistic ORD be maintained.
• The PM should establish a better working relationship among the agencies in defining
test requirements.
• The Combat Developer should appreciate the impact that changing requirements has on
the system and the test process.
• The PM should ensure that the major documents, to include the contract, are closely
coordinated.
/. Other Recommendations
The following recommendations focus on upgrade and NDI type
developments.
• PMs, as well as others, should avoid underestimating the DT&E process for NDI and
system upgrades.
• Historical test data and analysis information from components and subsystems should
be used to better estimate future tests, costs, and schedule.
• PMs should hold early TTWGs to address unique testing requirements, plans and
schedules.
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E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas should be investigated for potential benefit to the DOD:
• Developmental Strategy and Test Problems - One of the findings of this thesis
was that the type of development strategy influenced the number of test problems a
system encountered. Further research on the effect of development strategy on test
programs could provide insight for better tailoring of programs.
• Test Culture - Developmental Test and Evaluation could be significantly improved if
the relationship between the test community (testers and analysts) and the PM Office
were improved. Further research into the causes of this adversarial relationship with
emphasis on preventing or minimizing its impact on testing could provide valuable
information to the DOD.
• PM Incentives and the Acquisition Process - Researching the feasibility of
incorporating an incentive system for PMs which encouraged them to be "event driven
and user oriented" should be conducted. A meaningful and quantifiable rating and
evaluation system for PMs that stressed good management techniques vice political
maneuvering should be developed.
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APPENDIX A (PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE QUESTIONS)
Name: Location:
Title or Job Date:
Thank you for taking the time to meet/talk with me. I am conducting this research for my
master's thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School. The focus of my thesis is to identify
problems in developmental testing from the perspective of the various agencies
involved in DT&E. In my final product I hope to make some recommendations to correct
the problems or at least minimize the impact of these problems for future programs. I am
examining a number of systems and interviewing the key players in the developmental test
process of those systems as well as some others. My questions to you will primarily
address your interface with these other agencies, what you perceive as the major problem in
DT&E and how can you or the other agencies solve or alleviate the problem? I would also
welcome any additional comments that you have about any aspect of the developmental test
process. The information 1 collect will be confidential if you request. I will consolidate
and summarize all interview data so that your name will not be identified in any way.
PROGRAM MANAGERS




-The Combat Developer (user representative)
2. Is this sufficient?
3 . What do you consider the most significant problem or issue in
entering a Developmental Test?
4. Does this problem effect the cost and or scheduling of the DT?
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5.
What rules, regulations or policies exist that try to alleviate this problem? What
rules, regulations or policies only feed the problem?
6 Does the problem impact future testing - DT or OT? How?
7
.
What could you the PM do to deal with this problem?
8 What could be done by the Tester to deal with this problem?
-Are they aware of the problem?
9. What could be done by the Contractor to deal with this problem?
-Are they aware of the problem?
10. What could be done by the Combat Developer to deal with this problem?
-Are they aware of the problem?
1 1
.
What could be done by Agencies like AMSAA to deal with this problem?
-Are they aware of the problem?
1 2. What could be done by Legislative action to deal with this problem?
13. What do you consider as other key problems or issues in Developmental Testing?
1 4. What impact do these problems have on the cost and schedule of the test?
15. What could be done by who and how to deal with these problems?
•>
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Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
Army Research Laboratory
Assistant Secretary Of The Army (Research, Development &
Acquisition)
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Army Tactical Command and Control System
Concept Exploration (Phase)
Command Launch Unit
Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer
Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (Report)
Communications Security




Director, Defense Test and Evaluation
Demonstration and Validation Phase
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Directive
Department of Defense Instruction
Director Operational Test and Evaluation
Development Test
Director, Test and Evaluation
Development Test and Evaluation














Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation
General Accounting Office
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Improved Commander's Weapon Station
Inter Vehicular Information System
Joint Service Test and Evaluation
Lightweight Computer Unit
Live Fire Test and Evaluation
Low Rate Initial Production
Large Scale Printer Plotter
Maneuver Control System
Multi-Service Test and Evaluation
Non-Developmental Item
Operational Evaluation
Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command
Operational Requirements Document
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Operational Test Agencies
Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation




Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Service Acquisition Executive
Single Channel Ground and Air Radio System
Statement of Work





Army Test and Evaluation Command
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
Test and Experimentation Command
Test Integration Working Group
Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRADOC System Manager
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